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Non-technical Summary 
 
Typically, we distinguish between two different types of environmental innovations that miti-
gate the environmental burden of production: cleaner production and end-of-pipe technolo-
gies. Cleaner production reduces resource use and/or pollution at the source by using cleaner 
products and production methods, whereas end-of-pipe technologies curb pollution emissions 
by implementing add-on measures. Thus, cleaner products and production technologies are 
frequently seen as being superior to end-of-pipe technologies for both environmental and eco-
nomic reasons. 
The establishment of cleaner production technologies, however, is often hampered by 
barriers such as additional co-ordination input and a lack of organizational support within 
firms. In addition to substantial investment costs in new technologies, additional obstacles 
arise due to the nature of the environmental problem and the type of regulations involved. 
Command and Control (CaC) regulations, for instance, frequently impose technology stan-
dards that can only be met through end-of-pipe abatement measures. With particular respect 
to the diffusion of cleaner production and products, the question arises which one of several 
alternative policy approaches is to be preferred: performance standards, voluntary measures, 
or economic instruments which leave decisions about the appropriate abatement technology 
up to the firm? 
This paper analyzes factors that may enhance a firm’s propensity to implement cleaner 
products and production technologies rather than end-of-pipe technologies. It is a widespread 
assumption that end-of-pipe technologies still dominate investment decisions in firms. This is 
because there has been exceptionally little empirical analysis directed to the determinants of 
the use of specific types of abatement measures - principally because of the paucity of avail-
able data. On the basis of a unique facility-level data set based on a recent survey covering 
seven OECD countries (Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Norway, and the U.S.) 
we find a clear dominance of cleaner production in these countries: Surprisingly, 76.8% of 
our sample facilities report that they predominantly invest in cleaner production technologies. 
There are, however, significant differences: Most notably, Germany displays the lowest per-
centage of cleaner production technologies among these OECD countries (57.5 %), while 
Japan exhibits the highest respective share (86.5 %). The explanation is that Germany’s 
command and control policy heavily supported end-of-pipe technologies in the past. Recent 
empirical results, however, point to a growing importance of cleaner technologies in Ger-
many. 
 II 
 
Our estimation results, which are based on multinomial logit models, indicate that cost 
savings tend to favor clean production and that regulatory measures and the stringency of en-
vironmental policy are positively correlated to end-of-pipe technologies. These results suggest 
that the application of end-of-pipe measures depends at least partially on regulatory pressure, 
whereas cleaner production may be motivated − among other factors − by market forces. Fur-
thermore, we find empirical evidence that organizational innovations improve the technologi-
cal capabilities of facilities: General management systems and specific environmental man-
agement tools such as process control systems or environmental audits seem to support the 
implementation of cleaner production measures, presumably by improving the necessary in-
formation basis for the development of such technologies. We thus conclude that improve-
ments towards cleaner products and production may be achieved by developing and dissemi-
nating these management tools to a larger extent. Furthermore, the introduction of cleaner 
technologies and products is supported by R&D investment specifically related to environ-
mental matters. 
With particular respect to environmental product innovations, we find that a large ma-
jority of facilities in these OECD countries report that their measures are aimed at production 
processes and not so much at products to reduce environmental impacts. While pollution 
problems have been mastered quite successfully through the use of cleaner processes at the 
production site, product-integrated environmental innovations still seem to suffer from poor 
market incentives. Our estimation results based on a binary probit model indicate that the de-
terminants of environmental product innovations are quite similar to those of process innova-
tions. This might be explained by the fact that product-integrated environmental innovations 
include process changes “from cradle to grave”, in other words, there is a wide overlap be-
tween these two types of innovations. 
We conclude that additional investments in cleaner production and products may be 
stimulated by widening the cost gap between the two types of technologies, for instance, by 
additionally charging for the use of waste and energy. The potential for continuously substi-
tuting end-of-pipe technologies with cleaner technologies might be limited, however, since 
not all regulations favoring end-of-pipe technologies can be cut down. For example, addi-
tional filters currently reduce particulate emissions of Diesel cars more effectively than the 
more eco-efficient Diesel engines. Thus, a certain amount of end-of-pipe technologies will 
still be necessary to curb specific emissions which cannot easily reduced with cleaner produc-
tion measures.  
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1 Introduction 
Typically, we distinguish between two different types of environmental innovations that miti-
gate the environmental burden of production: cleaner production and end-of-pipe technolo-
gies. Cleaner production reduces resource use and/or pollution at the source by using cleaner 
products and production methods, whereas end-of-pipe technologies curb pollution emissions 
by implementing add-on measures. Thus, cleaner products and production technologies are 
frequently seen as being superior to end-of-pipe technologies for both environmental and eco-
nomic reasons. 
The establishment of cleaner production technologies, however, is often hampered by 
barriers such as additional co-ordination input and a lack of organizational support within 
firms. In addition to substantial investment costs in new technologies, additional obstacles 
arise due to the nature of the environmental problem and the type of regulations involved. 
Command and Control (CaC) regulations, for instance, frequently impose technology stan-
dards that can only be met through end-of-pipe abatement measures. With particular respect 
to the diffusion of cleaner production and products, the question arises which one of several 
alternative policy approaches is to be preferred: performance standards, voluntary measures, 
or economic instruments which leave decisions about the appropriate abatement technology 
up to the firm? 
There has been exceptionally little empirical analysis directed at the diffusion of spe-
cific types of environmental technologies, principally because of the paucity of available data 
(BRUNNERMEIER and COHEN, 2003; JAFFE et al., 2002). In particular, it is still unknown to 
what extent and why firms may shift from end-of-pipe solutions to cleaner production and 
products. There is a further set of related questions: First, do internal factors, such as the exis-
tence of environmental management systems (EMSs), support the environmental innovation 
decision for cleaner production and products? Secondly: Are innovation decisions driven by 
external factors, such as environmental regulations and pressure from suppliers, customers, or 
other stakeholders? Finally, do other factors than market demand for environmentally benefi-
cial products also influence decisions in favor of environmental product innovations? 
This paper empirically analyzes facilities’ discrete choice between different environ-
mental innovation types. On the basis of a facility and firm-level database derived from a re-
cent OECD survey, we first attempt to identify the determinants of end-of-pipe and cleaner 
production technologies by using a multinomial logit model. We then employ a binary probit 
model in order to investigate the impact of these factors on the environmental product and 
process innovations selected by a facility. Our unique cross-country database allows us to 
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address the influence of a variety of correlates, such as environmental policy instruments, 
market forces, the impact of pressure groups and (environmental) management tools on the 
firms’ environmental innovation behavior. 
Given the potential relative advantages of cleaner products and production technolo-
gies, it seems natural that policy makers are primarily interested in such incentives that affect 
the firms’ choice among various types of environmental innovations. Furthermore, it appears 
particularly desirable from the perspective of environmental policy to identify incentives that 
can be influenced by policy measures, such as performance standards, flexible economic in-
struments, public procurement, voluntary measures, technology support programs, and to iso-
late motives that are mainly spurred by other determinants, such as consumer preferences and 
firm-specific factors. 
In the subsequent section, we commence with the description of environmental inno-
vation types and how these types are addressed in our analysis. Section 3 reviews the litera-
ture on trends and determinants pertaining to the shift from end-of-pipe to cleaner production. 
Section 4 provides a descriptive summary of our data set. In Section 5, we analyze the deci-
sion between end-of-pipe and cleaner production technologies using a multinomial discrete 
choice model. Section 6 uses the same variables to investigate whether determinants regard-
ing the introduction of cleaner processes and products differ from each other. The final sec-
tion concludes this study. 
2  Types of Environmental Innovations 
The OECD (1997) Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting Technological Innovation Data 
distinguish between technical and organizational innovations, with technical innovations be-
ing divided into product and process innovations (for an illustration of theses distinctions, see 
Figure 1): 
- Process innovations enable the production of a given amount of output (goods, services) 
with less input. 
- Product innovations encompass the improvement of goods and services or the develop-
ment of new goods. 
- Organizational innovations include new forms of management, such as total quality man-
agement. 
This distinction is in line with the technical guidelines of the Society of German Engineers 
(VDI) which sets forth industrial environmental protection measures and their respective costs 
(VDI, 2001). Process-related measures are commonly subdivided into end-of-pipe technolo-
gies and integrated technologies (hereinafter: cleaner production technologies). According to 
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the VDI (2001) end-of-pipe technologies do not make up an essential part of the production 
process, but are add-on measures so as to comply with environmental requirements. Incinera-
tion plants (waste disposal), waste water treatment plants (water protection), sound absorbers 
(noise abatement), and exhaust-gas cleaning equipment (air quality control) are typical exam-
ples of end-of-pipe technologies. In contrast, cleaner production technologies are seen as di-
rectly reducing environmentally harmful impacts during the production process. The recircu-
lation of materials, the use of environmentally friendly materials (e.g. replacing organic sol-
vents by water), and the modification of the combustion chamber design (process-integrated 
systems) are examples of cleaner production technologies.  
Typically, end-of-pipe technologies, such as filters utilized for desulphurization, aim at 
diminishing harmful substances that occur as by-products of production. In contrast, cleaner 
production measures generally lead to both reductions of by-products and energy and resource 
inputs. Finally, organizational measures include the re-organization of processes and respon-
sibilities within the firm with the objective to reduce environmental impacts. Environmental 
management systems (EMS) are typical examples of organizational measures. Organizational 
innovations contribute to the firms’ technological opportunities and can be supporting factors 
for technological innovations.  
 
Figure 1: Types of Environmental Innovations   
 
 
  
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Frequently, firms hope that innovations will offset the burden and cost induced by envi-
ronmental regulation or, at least, that they will help them to reach environmental policy goals 
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without severe negative economic consequences. Reduced costs, increased competitiveness, 
the creation of new markets for environmentally desirable products and processes, positive 
employment effects, etc. are seen as potential benefits of an innovation-friendly environ-
mental policy. Yet, these benefits can be realized more easily with cleaner products and 
cleaner production technologies than with end-of-pipe measures, since end-of-pipe technolo-
gies fulfill, by definition, primarily environmental protection tasks. 
Thus, cleaner production technologies are frequently more advantageous than end-of-pipe 
technologies for both environmental and economic reasons. But technology choices are often 
influenced by the specific environmental problem and the regulatory framework stipulating a 
certain technology standard that can only be reached with end-of-pipe measures. Apart from 
the flexibility of regulation, the choice among these two technology options also hinges on the 
option that is more cost-effective when meeting the required standards.  
In short, the total replacement of end-of-pipe technologies by cleaner production measures 
is certainly not possible. In practise, there will always be a mix of end-of-pipe and cleaner 
production technologies that depends on the underlying environmental targets, technology 
options, and related costs. Nevertheless, there is wide agreement on the following three find-
ings. Firstly, environmental regulations relied far more on end-of-pipe in the past than on 
cleaner production technologies. Secondly, these technologies are still dominating in OECD 
countries, and, thirdly, shifts to cleaner production would be beneficial (RENNINGS et al., 
2004a; 2004b). 
3  Trends and Determinants of Facilities’ Environmental Technology Choice 
Investments in cleaner production technologies cannot be separated all that easily from other, 
non-environmental technologies (SPRENGER, 2004). Therefore, data on the use of cleaner pro-
duction technologies have hardly ever, if at all, been included in official environmental statis-
tics thus far. Although international statistical offices, such as the OECD and, EUROSTAT 
(1999), agreed to add cleaner production to environmental protection activities, international 
statistics on the use of cleaner production technologies are still unavailable. On the other 
hand, statistical data indicates that investments in end-of-pipe technologies decreased during 
the 1990ies (for Germany, see Figure 2). This observation raises the question as to whether 
this fact might be explained by the shift of investments to cleaner production technologies. 
Unfortunately, the literature on environmental innovation cannot provide a satisfying 
answer to this question to date, because it heavily draws upon insights of general empirical 
innovation research, which neither distinguishes between environmental and non-
environmental innovations nor between end-of-pipe and cleaner production technologies. In 
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the remaining part of this section, we will review the innovation literature with a focus on the 
general determinants of innovation decisions that may be decisive for the choice of environ-
mental abatement technologies. 
 
Figure 2: Investments in End-of-pipe Technologies in German Industry in the 1990ies 
(BECKER and GRUNDMANN (2002:421-422)). 
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The general innovation literature discussed intensely as to whether technological inno-
vation is triggered by supply-push or demand-pull factors, or by both. Often, these factors are 
also called technology-push and market-pull factors, respectively, with market-pull factors 
emphasizing the role of consumers’, firms’ and the government’s demand as determinants of 
environmental innovation (HEMMELSKAMP, 1997). While corporate image and preferences for 
environmentally friendly products are typical examples of market-pull factors, technology-
push factors include subsidies that promote research and development (R&D). 
Empirical evidence indicates that both market-pull and technology-push factors are 
relevant for spurring technological progress and innovation (PAVITT, 1984). This also seems 
to be plausible for the choice among environmental abatement technologies, with market-pull 
factors being expected to be more important for cleaner products and processes than for end-
of-pipe technologies. The major technology-push and market-pull factors found in innovation 
literature are the technological capabilities, the possibility of appropriation, market structure 
and other factors that are described in the following section. 
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Technological capabilities 
The concept of technological capabilities, conceived by ROSENBERG (1974), encompasses the 
knowledge and know-how of the development of new processes and products. Empirical stud-
ies support the hypothesis that technological capabilities are decisive determinants of innova-
tion cost. They are thus important factors for innovation decisions (COHEN, 1995) and rele-
vant for both cleaner production and end-of-pipe technologies. JANZ et al. (2003) find evi-
dence that private R&D activities are decisive internal push factors for innovation activities, 
especially for knowledge-intensive sectors. Financial resources and skilled employees 
(CZARNITZKI, 2002), R&D activities, especially activities dedicated to environmental issues, 
and the support of organizational structures, such as management systems, in particular EMSs 
also represent important internal capabilities for successful innovation activities. Empirical 
evidence on the positive impact of EMSs on environmental innovation is found by RENNINGS 
et al. (2003) and REHFELD et al. (2004), while FRONDEL et al. (2004a) do not find any signifi-
cant influence. 
Possibility of appropriation 
Research investment differs from physical investment, because it is difficult to exclude third 
parties from the assets produced by the research process. As noted in the classic contribution 
by ARROW (1962), the creator of these assets will typically fail to appropriate most or even all 
of the social returns it generates. Much of the social returns will accrue as spillovers to com-
peting firms and consumers. The appropriation problem is likely to lead to significant under-
investment in R&D by private firms (JAFFE et al., 2002). Innovation incentives may increase 
if the private innovator can appropriate the expected innovation rents. The creation of a tem-
porary monopoly by patents, the implementation of market barriers to complicate and hamper 
imitation, or keeping the innovation secret are instruments that can be used to ensure appro-
priation. Yet, the appropriation problem seems to be of minor importance for environmental 
innovations, since the expected rents are rather low due to the good public character of most 
environmental goods and services. In addition, this problem can be expected to be of lower 
importance for environmental process innovations than for product innovations.  
Market structure 
One of two major innovation incentives is the expectation of innovation rents, even if these 
rents are temporary (COHEN, 1995). In addition to R&D investment profits, strategic advan-
tages over rivals are also motivating forces for innovations (CARRARO 2000). Innovation rents 
are commonly expected to be higher in oligopolistic regimes than in highly competitive mar-
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kets. SCHUMPETER (1942) argues that firms with large market shares are superior with regard 
to innovations due to potential economies of scale for inventive activities. There is also em-
pirical evidence that highly concentrated industries are more innovative than others (MANS-
FIELD, 1968, SCHERER, 1967). Yet, once monopolistic rents are secured, the pressure to inno-
vate may decrease. New products and processes are more frequently developed in deregulated 
markets than in regulated markets (BEISE and RENNINGS, 2003). Thus, a few empirical studies 
also find support for the hypothesis that market concentration has a negative effect on innova-
tions (GEROSKI, 1990, WILLIAMSON, 1965). Regarding the technology choice between end-of-
pipe and cleaner production, it can be expected that firms in protected markets are more likely 
to opt for end-of-pipe technologies. They can concentrate on environmental protection func-
tions since they experience less competitive pressure to simultaneously improve their resource 
efficiency. 
Miscellaneous factors, such as market demand, sector specific differences, and firm size 
Both actual and expected market demand crucially affect firms’ decisions on R&D invest-
ments, especially concerning product innovations (HARABI, 1997). Of course, this also holds 
true for cleaner production investments and, in particular, environmental product innovations. 
Furthermore, due to specific market situations and technology options the “modes of innova-
tive search” and the technology choice between end-of-pipe and cleaner production measures 
differ from sector to sector (DOSI, 1988). Innovation processes in the pharmaceutical industry, 
for example, appear to be rather complex, particularly in comparison to the textile industry, 
where innovations frequently consist in changes of textile designs. Finally, the complexity of 
innovations seems to determine the role that the firm’s size plays for innovation behavior. 
Empirical findings are controversial, though. While complex innovations - most notably proc-
ess innovations - can be easily accomplished by large firms, less complex innovations - com-
monly product innovations - frequently originate from small firms due to their higher degree 
of flexibility (PAVITT, 1984). The general existence of economies of scale for innovation ac-
tivities has not yet been empirically confirmed. 
Beyond such technology-push and market-pull factors, regulations are often consid-
ered to be an important driving force for environmental innovation. This is at least partially 
due to the public-goods character of environmental innovation (RENNINGS, 2000) which leads 
to underinvestment in environmentally related R&D. It is argued that market forces alone 
would provide insufficient innovation incentives and that consumers’ willingness to pay for 
environmental improvements would be too low. The Porter Hypothesis underscores the view 
that regulations can trigger environmental innovations and postulates that in a non-optimizing 
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world strict environmental policy may spur "innovation offsets", that is, environmental inno-
vations can offset the burden and cost induced by regulations and create new markets for en-
vironmentally desirable products and processes. In a series of case studies, PORTER and VAN 
DER LINDE (1995) find anecdotical evidence for their hypothesis.  
The Porter Hypothesis has been received with skepticism, however (see JAFFE and 
PALMER (1996)). While it is widely agreed that potentials for cost savings and improved effi-
ciency may exist in imperfect markets, it is frequently argued that these potentials are rather 
limited (ULPH, 1996). Nevertheless, the Porter Hypothesis might be valid for both of our 
technology options due to the secondary benefits of an innovation-friendly environmental 
policy: end-of-pipe technologies might increase, for instance, the competitiveness of an indus-
try that is the forerunner of an international trend. If a country imposes a specific regulation 
on an industry that requires end-of-pipe investments, firms might have gained a competitive 
“first mover” advantage in the long run once other countries adapt the same regulation. Strict 
environmental regulations may also improve the competitiveness of firms in the long run by 
stimulating resource and cost-efficient, cleaner production measures.  
Empirical evidence on this issue is rare due to a lack of technology specific firm data. 
By analyzing the effects of a German environmental investment program, HORBACH et al. 
(1995) show that in some cases process-integrated measures, as opposed to end-of-pipe tech-
nologies, lead to significant cost savings. The same results are obtained in a series of cases 
studies carried out by HITCHENS et al. (2003) for European SMEs. Furthermore, WALZ (1999) 
shows that the introduction of new, integrated technologies in order to curb CO2 emissions 
may lead to an increase in total factor productivity. Finally, industry surveys conducted by 
PFEIFFER and RENNINGS (2001), RENNINGS and ZWICK (2002), and RENNINGS et al. (2003) 
confirm that environmental innovations have a small but nevertheless beneficial economic 
impact on sales and employment. It remains unclear whether such a small impact induces 
firms to shift their investments from end-of-pipe to cleaner production technologies. 
Market-based instruments have been regarded as superior in the early environmental 
innovation literature with particular respect to the choice of the appropriate environmental 
policy instruments (DOWNING and WHITE, 1986, MILLIMAN and PRINCE, 1989). This charac-
terization has been confirmed for situations of perfect competition and information. Yet, un-
der conditions of imperfect competition, results originating from general equilibrium models 
of endogenous growth and game theory models suggest that regulation standards may be a 
more appropriate method for stimulating innovation, particularly when firms gain “strategic 
advantages” from innovation, see CARRARO (2000) and MONTERO (2002). Furthermore, when 
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the endogeneity of technological progress is taken into account, as it is done in evolutionary 
economics as well as in the new institutional and growth theory1, none of the policy instru-
ments is generally preferable. According to FISCHER et al. (2003), the welfare gain of envi-
ronmental policy instruments critically depends on the circumstances involved. FRONDEL et 
al. (2004a) find that generally policy stringency is more important than the choice of single 
policy instruments. 
4  The OECD Data Set and Descriptive Results 
In our analysis of different abatement technologies, we use a facility and firm-level data set 
established within a recent OECD survey on environmental policy tools and their impact on 
firm management practices in manufacturing. The survey was performed in 2003 and covers 
seven OECD countries: Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Norway, and the USA. 
The whole data set includes 4,186 observations originating from manufacturing facilities with 
more than 50 employees. The questionnaire contains questions on the facilities’ environ-
mental impacts, their motivations for the implementation of environmental practices and 
abatement technologies, the influence of stakeholders, management systems as well as of the 
environmental policy framework, and, last but not least, facility-specific structural character-
istics (for more details, see the description of our variables provided in Section 5 and the Ap-
pendix). 
Table 1 indicates that 3,100 of our sample facilities, that is around 74%, took signifi-
cant technical measures to reduce the environmental impacts associated with their activities. 
Out of these facilities with altered production processes 76.8% changed their production tech-
nologies and only a minority of about 23% implemented end-of-pipe technologies. This is a 
surprising result, since it is a widespread assumption that end-of-pipe technologies still domi-
nate investment decisions in firms. Recent surveys, though, indicate that cleaner production 
innovations have almost caught up, see the German survey by CLEFF and RENNINGS (1999), 
or even exceeded the share of end-of-pipe innovations, see the survey by RENNINGS and 
ZWICK (2002) for the European context. 
Table 1: Distribution of Abatement Technology Types in our Sample Facilities in 2003 
 
Cleaner Production Measures 
End-of-Pipe Technologies 
Total 
2380 
720 
3100 
76.8% 
23.2% 
100% 
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive summary, see AGHION and HOWITT 1998. 
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Regarding the introduction of  product or process innovations, the respondents of our 
sample firms indicated which of these innovation types they use predominantly. Not surpris-
ingly, most facilities report that they took more significant measures in the area of production 
processes than in product design (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Distribution of Product and Process Innovations in our Sample Facilities   
 
Product Innovations 
Process Innovations 
Total 
486 
2632 
3118 
15.6% 
84.4% 
100% 
 
There are, however, significant differences among the interviewed OECD countries. 
Most notably, Germany displays the lowest percentage of cleaner production technologies 
among the seven OECD countries (see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: Choice of Environmental Technologies in Seven OECD Countries 
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The share of cleaner production technologies ranges from 57.5 % in Germany to 
86.5 % in Japan (for more details on the German data, see FRONDEL et al., 2004b). The reason 
for this result is that CaC heavily supported end-of-pipe technologies in Germany in the past 
(HAUFF und SOLBACH, 1999). But recent empirical results point to a growing importance of 
cleaner technologies in Germany (see HORBACH 2003a and 2003b). 
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While a large majority of our sample facilities reports that the established measures to 
reduce environmental impacts tend to aim at production processes and not at products, Ger-
many and Hungary exhibit the lowest proportion of facilities stating that they implemented 
product measures (see Figure 4). These results are in line with findings of recent surveys in 
Germany (e.g. REHFELD et al., 2004) and Europe (RENNINGS and ZWICK, 2002). These sur-
veys confirm the general view that rate and direction of environmentally benign technological 
progress differ according to the type of innovation. While pollution problems have been coun-
tered quite successfully through the use of cleaner processes at the production site, product 
integrated environmental innovations still suffer from poor market incentives (RENNINGS et 
al., 2004b). The crucial problem still seems to be that environmental innovations are not 
scaled up from niche markets to mass markets (take-off phase).  
 
Figure 4: Incidence of Measures Undertaken (Production rather than Product) 
 
 
5 Determinants of Technology Choice End-of-pipe vs. Cleaner Production  
Using an unordered multinomial logit model, i.e., discrete choice methods, we analyze why 
firms decide to introduce different abatement technologies. On the basis of the OECD firm 
and facility-level data set summarized in the previous section, we capture a firm’s decision on 
a specific environmental abatement technology by applying the categorical variable choice, 
which reflects three distinct unordered abatement choices: 
(1) end-of-pipe technologies, 
(2) cleaner production technologies, and  
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(3) the no-abatement option – no new environmental technologies are implemented. 
Respondents of our sample firms indicated which of these technology types characterized 
the nature of their abatement measures most accurately. While a firm may use both types of 
technology, our categorical variable choice reflects the technology that is predominantly em-
ployed by a firm. Clearly, this variable may suffer from the fact that the identification of 
process-integrated technologies is rather difficult, because they can be easily confused with 
ordinary production processes. Another problem results from the fact that firms sometimes 
cannot easily choose between end-of-pipe technologies or integrated measures – a problem 
that is based on technological restrictions. Our econometric model addresses this issue by 
using dummies for branches, because some types of technological abatement options may be 
industry-specific (see the discussion on sector-specific modes of innovative search outlined in 
Section 3). 
The individual decision of a facility to opt for one of the three abatement alternatives 
depends on factors that are divided into the following five categories2: 
(1) Motivations: This category captures the goals of environmental protection activities, such 
as expected corporate image improvements, cost savings due to the implementation of abate-
ment technologies or potential avoidance of environmental incidents. (Italic terms stand for 
the names of the variables used in the tables presenting our estimation results). 
(2) Environmental policy instruments: This category comprises respondents' assessment of the 
importance of market-based instruments, such as environmental taxes, regulatory measures 
(input bans and technology standards), information measures, and subsidies. The stringency 
of a government’s environmental policy may also foster abatement decisions. The variable 
policy stringency describes respondents’ perception of the stringency of environmental regu-
lation. 
(3) Management tools: Different management practices, such as health and safety manage-
ment systems and process or job control systems, may have distinct implications for the 
choice of abatement technologies. Process control systems, for instance, may help identify 
energy saving potentials by controlling the whole production process and thus may serve as 
an information basis for the design of cleaner technologies. This may also be true for specific 
environmental management tools, such as written environmental policies, internal environ-
mental audits, environmental accounting, and public environmental reports. In many cases, 
the firms need sufficient information about the environmental impacts at each phase of the 
                                                 
2 All variables are constructed from the answers provided by the survey respondents. This approach is far from 
unproblematic, since these responses reflect both genuine variations across facilities and individual differences 
in the perception of the respondents. For descriptive statistics and details on construction, see the Appendix.  
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production process so as to implement cleaner technologies. Environmental management 
practices may help to provide this information basis. 
(4) Pressure groups: This category reflects the –influence of interest groups – as perceived by 
the survey respondents – such as industrial associations and labor unions (summarized in the 
variable unions), internal forces, such as corporate headquarters and management employees, 
commercial and private customers, and environmental (green) organizations. 
(5) Facility Characteristics: Abatement decisions may be affected by a set of facility-specific 
covariates that are discussed in the literature review provided in Section 3. Such covariates 
are, for instance, facility size and turnover, measured in terms of number of employees and 
sales, respectively. Finally, the relevance of environmental impacts of any kind of pollution 
and a person explicitly responsible for environmental concerns, identified as officer, might 
also be relevant. Furthermore, a specific research and development budget for environmental 
matters (R&D) was used as an indicator for the respective technological capabilities. Quanti-
tative indicators for research and development were not available due to a high number of 
missing values. The influence of the market structure was captured in the variable competition 
reflecting the number of competitors of the responding firm. 
Estimation results for our multinomial logit model are reported in Table 3 and indicate 
a significant, positive correlation of environmental policy stringency with the introduction of 
end-of-pipe technologies, but not with cleaner production. This result is perfectly in line with 
recent theoretical research on the innovation effects triggered by various environmental policy 
instruments described in Section 3, which suggests that policy stringency is more important 
than the choice of a single environmental policy instrument. While theoretical considerations 
would expect that a strict environmental policy would have a significant effect on both end-
of-pipe technology and cleaner production, the relative importance of policy stringency for 
end-of-pipe technologies might be explained by the fact that CaC is still the dominating envi-
ronmental policy. Cleaner production measures, however, tend to be stimulated by other fac-
tors than CaC. 
This interpretation is in accordance with the observed differences in the impacts of en-
vironmental instruments: The implementation of end-of-pipe measures seems to be fostered 
by input bans and technology and performance-based standards, whereas the respective vari-
able regulatory measures is not significant for the introduction of cleaner production tech-
nologies. This result might be explained by the fact that cleaner production measures have 
been less subject to environmental regulations so far.  
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Table 3: Multinomial Logit Model of Available Abatement Options 
 
 End-of-pipe Cleaner Pro-
duction 
 End-of-pipe Cleaner Pro-
duction 
Environmental Policy  Motivations 
 
Image 
Incidents 
Cost Savings 
 
1.03 (0.18) 
1.47 (2.85)** 
1.23 (1.63) 
 
1.10 (0.84) 
1.37 (2.88)** 
1.62 (4.53)** 
 Facility Characteristics 
 
 
Policy Stringency 
Regulatory 
Measures 
 
Market  
Instruments 
Information 
Voluntary  
Measures  
Subsidies 
 
1.43 (2.15)* 
1.34 (2.11)* 
 
 
1.30 (1.86) 
 
0.82 (-1.13) 
0.90 (-0.52) 
 
1.08 (0.46) 
 
1.22 (1.27) 
1.14 (1.12) 
 
 
1.06 (0.47) 
 
0.80 (-1.48) 
1.02 (0.12) 
 
1.15 (0.97) 
Competition 
Impacts 
Officer 
R&D 
Size 
Turnover 
0.91 (-0.79) 
1.78 (4.34)** 
2.11 (4.86)** 
1.31 (1.03) 
1.00 (-0.27) 
1.07 (0.51) 
1.02 (0.15) 
1.40 (2.95)** 
1.63 (4.07)** 
1.75 (2.47)* 
1.00 (-1.95)* 
1.02 (0.23) 
 Pressure Groups  Country Dummies 
 
Internal Forces 
Unions 
Green orgs 
 
1.43 (2.60)** 
0.65 (-1.92) 
1.01 (0.09) 
 
1.52 (3.57)** 
0.84 (-0.88) 
0.96 (-0.32) 
Germany 
France 
Hungary 
Japan 
Norway 
USA 
0.28 (-4.76)** 
0.56 (-1.76) 
1.79 (1.91) 
1.54 (1.59) 
0.92 (-0.26) 
1.73 (1.76)* 
0.21 (-6.62)** 
1.34 (1.06) 
2.37 (3.27)** 
4.92 (6.93)** 
1.15 (0.53) 
2.20 (2.81)** 
 Management Tools  Industry Dummies 
 
Health and Safety 
System 
Process or Job 
Control System 
Written Envi-
ronmental Policy 
Internal Audits 
Environmental 
Accounting 
and Reports 
 
1.29 (1.98)* 
 
1.13 (0.85) 
 
1.45 (2.42)* 
 
1.26 (1.53) 
2.00 (4.05)** 
 
1.28 (1.56) 
 
1.44 (3.49)** 
 
1.33 (2.35)* 
 
1.52 (3.31)** 
 
1.58 (3.72)** 
1.71 (3.52)** 
 
1.52 (2.98)** 
 
Textile 
Wood 
Paper 
Chemicals 
Minerals 
Metals 
Machines 
Transport 
Other sectors 
 
0.79 (-0.81) 
0.50 (-2.22)* 
0.92 (-0.30) 
0.77 (-1.14) 
1.46 (1.14) 
0.84 (-0.79)    
0.37 (-4.43)** 
0.42 (-2.96)** 
0.79 (-0.53) 
 
0.61 (-2.01)* 
0.70 (-1.39) 
0.92 (-0.36) 
0.77 (-1.28) 
1.17 (0.51) 
0.94 (-0.34) 
0.57 (-3.13)** 
0.58 (-2.28)* 
0.86 (-0.40)  
 
Number of observations: 3699. χ2 (78) = 1267.71. Pseudo R2 = 0.178. The base category is “no abatement tech-
nology”.. Z-statistics are given in parentheses; * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respec-
tively., Odds ratios for one unit changes in the corresponding variables are reported instead of coefficients. 
 
An important assumption of multinomial logit models is that outcome categories have the property of independ-
ence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). The results of Hausman/McFadden tests have shown that there is no sys-
tematic change in the coefficients if we exclude one of the alternatives. 
 
Surprisingly, there is no significant impact of market-based environmental instru-
ments, a result that is explained by the fact that policy instruments do not have a significant 
impact if their implementation is lax. Particularly market-based instruments, such as eco-
taxes, are often watered down in the political process. Another result suggests that innova-
tions in cleaner production technologies tend to be market-driven and not so much regulation-
driven: cost savings tend to favor process-integrated measures and not end-of-pipe technolo-
gies.  
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This result supports the view that the nature of integrated technologies often leads to 
energy and/or material savings as well as cost savings. Furthermore, technological capabilities 
seem to be more important for cleaner technologies than for end-of-pipe measures. The re-
spective variable R&D is only significant for cleaner technologies. 
Not surprisingly, the occurrence of environmental incidents spurs the introduction of 
both technology types. Among pressure groups the internal forces, such as corporate head-
quarters and management, have statistically significant positive effects on the implementation 
of environmental technologies, be it end-of-pipe or cleaner production technologies. External 
forces, such as labor unions (unions) or environmental or neighborhood groups (green orgs) 
do not seem to be influential with respect to either decision. 
Furthermore, (environmental) management tools appear to be particularly important 
for the introduction of clean technologies. Process or job control systems significantly pro-
mote the implementation of integrated technologies. It seems to be plausible that internal en-
vironmental audits and the preparation of environmental reports are not significantly impor-
tant for end-of-pipe measures but for cleaner technologies, since both policy tools may help to 
get the information required for cleaner technologies. The implementation and operation of 
cleaner technologies is often more complex than for end-of-pipe-technologies. In contrast, 
environmental accounting and a written environmental policy seem to favor the realization of 
both types of abatement technologies. One explanation might be that environmental account-
ing reveals the facilities’ problems in this area, which may lead to, first, the documentation of 
both environmental problems and solutions and, second, to abatement actions, irrespective of 
the type of technology options. 
Our estimation results indicate that the high importance of environmental impacts for 
firms is positively correlated with the realization of environmental investment – indeed, no 
surprising result. The introduction of both types of abatement measures is significantly pro-
moted if at least one employee is explicitly responsible for environmental concerns, indicated 
by the dummy variable officer. Estimation results for the industry dummies, which capture the 
distinct technological options across industries, confirm our expectation that the implementa-
tion of cleaner production and end-of-pipe measures varies across branches. 
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6 Product versus Process Innovations 
In this section, we investigate a firm’s decision to introduce environmental product innova-
tions by applying a binary probit model. Because of the violation of the IIA assumption, we 
will not estimate the same multinomial model as in the previous section, which showed proc-
ess- and product innovations versus the no-abatement alternative. Instead, we analyze a firm’s 
binary decision to introduce product instead of process innovations: Respondents of our sam-
ple facilities indicated which type of technology was implemented and reflects the nature of 
their environmental innovations, product or process innovations of their firm most accurately.  
 
Table 4: Probit Model of the Available Product Innovations (1) versus Process Innova-
tions (0). 
 
Environmental Policy  Motivations 
 
Image 
Incidents 
Cost Savings 
 
0.03 (1.62) 
-0.01 (-0.82) 
0.01 (0.44) 
 Facility Characteristics
 
 
Policy Stringency 
Regulatory 
Measures 
Market  
Instruments 
Information 
Voluntary  
Measures  
Subsidies 
 
-0.02 (-0.81) 
0.02 (1.25) 
 
-0.02 (-0.96) 
 
0.01 (0.50) 
0.00 (0.17) 
 
0.02 (0.80) 
 
 
Competition 
Impacts 
Officer 
Primary customer 
R&D 
Size 
Turnover 
 
0.01 (0.32) 
-0.01 (-0.68) 
-0.02 (-1.19) 
0.01 (0.40) 
0.01 (0.32) 
-0.00 (-1.30) 
-0.02 (-1.07) 
 Pressure Groups  Country Dummies 
 
Internal Forces 
Customers 
Unions 
Green orgs 
 
-0.01 (-0.38) 
0.02 (1.13) 
-0.01 (-0.42) 
-0.01 (-0.45) 
 
 
Germany 
France 
Hungary 
Japan 
Norway 
USA 
 
-0.11 (-3.73)** 
0.01 (0.27) 
-0.07 (-2.33)* 
0.01 (0.35) 
-0.00 (-0.06) 
0.04 (1.08) 
 
 Management Tools  Industry Dummies 
 
Health and Safety 
System 
Process or Job 
Control System 
Written Envi-
ronmental Policy 
Internal Audit 
Environmental 
Accounting and  
Report 
 
-0.00 (-0.00) 
 
-0.00 (-0.18) 
 
-0.02 (-0.94) 
 
0.01 (1.28) 
-0.03 (-1.50) 
 
-0.00 (-0.03) 
 
Textile 
Wood 
Paper 
Chemicals 
Minerals 
Metals 
Machines 
Transport 
Other sectors 
 
0.13 (2.63)** 
0.16 (3.40)** 
0.12 (2.90)** 
0.13 (3.78)** 
0.09 (1.76) 
0.06 (1.97)* 
0.13 (3.96)** 
0.08 (1.87) 
0.14 (2.16)* 
Number of observations: 2776. χ2 (41) = 126.97. Pseudo R2 = 0.053. Z-statistics are given in parentheses; * and 
** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Marginal effects are reported instead of coefficients.
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Apart from country and industry-specific differences, the determinants of our estima-
tion results3 do not show any difference between the two innovation decisions (see Table 4). 
In short, the determinants of product and process innovations appear to be quite similar. This 
outcome might be explained by the fact that there is a wide overlap between these two types 
of innovations, which becomes obvious when taking a closer look at the European Commis-
sion’s definition of product-integrated environmental innovations. 
According to this definition (see EC 2001 and 2003), environmental product innova-
tions include process changes “from cradle to grave”, in other words, an improvement of the 
environmental performance of products including the selection of raw materials or supplied 
parts, the research and development phase, as well as the production, consumption, and dis-
posal phases.  
7 Summary and Conclusions  
This paper analyzes factors that may enhance a firm’s propensity to implement cleaner prod-
ucts and production technologies rather than end-of-pipe technologies. While both of these 
two fundamental types of abatement measures mitigate the adverse environmental impacts of 
production, cleaner production technologies are frequently more advantageous than end-of-
pipe technologies for both environmental and economic reasons. In fact, environmental inno-
vations are more often identified with cleaner production measures than with end-of-pipe 
technologies, which reduce environmental impacts by using add-on measures without chang-
ing the production process. 
Nevertheless, it is a widespread assumption that end-of-pipe technologies still domi-
nate investment decisions in firms. This is because there has been exceptionally little empiri-
cal analysis directed to the determinants of the use of specific types of abatement measures - 
principally because of the paucity of available data. On the basis of a unique facility-level 
data set based on a recent survey covering seven OECD countries (Canada, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Japan, Norway, and the U.S.) we find a clear dominance of cleaner production in 
these countries: Surprisingly, 76.8% of our sample facilities report that they predominantly 
invest in cleaner production technologies. There are, however, significant differences: Most 
notably, Germany displays the lowest percentage of cleaner production technologies among 
these OECD countries (57.5 %), while Japan exhibits the highest respective share (86.5 %). 
                                                 
3 Note that product design is likely to be within the responsibility of a firm and not so much of a facility. While 
attempting to take account of this aspect by including a binary variable in our model that indicates whether or 
not a facility belongs to a multi-facility firm, we were unable to find a significant impact of this variable due to 
the corresponding high number of missing values. 
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The explanation is that Germany’s command and control policy heavily supported end-of-
pipe technologies in the past. Recent empirical results, however, point to a growing impor-
tance of cleaner technologies in Germany. 
Our estimation results, which are based on multinomial logit models, indicate that cost 
savings tend to favor clean production and that regulatory measures and the stringency of en-
vironmental policy are positively correlated to end-of-pipe technologies. These results suggest 
that the application of end-of-pipe measures depends at least partially on regulatory pressure,  
whereas cleaner production may be motivated − among other factors − by market forces. Fur-
thermore, we find empirical evidence that organizational innovations improve the technologi-
cal capabilities of facilities: General management systems and specific environmental man-
agement tools such as process control systems or environmental audits seem to support the 
implementation of cleaner production measures, presumably by improving the necessary in-
formation basis for the development of such technologies. We thus conclude that improve-
ments towards cleaner products and production may be achieved by developing and dissemi-
nating these management tools to a larger extent. Furthermore, the introduction of cleaner 
technologies and products is supported by R&D investment specifically related to environ-
mental matters. 
With particular respect to environmental product innovations, we find that a large ma-
jority of facilities in these OECD countries report that their measures are aimed at production 
processes and not so much at products to reduce environmental impacts. While pollution 
problems have been mastered quite successfully through the use of cleaner processes at the 
production site, product-integrated environmental innovations still seem to suffer from poor 
market incentives. Our estimation results based on a binary probit model indicate that the de-
terminants of environmental product innovations are quite similar to those of process innova-
tions. This might be explained by the fact that product-integrated environmental innovations 
include process changes “from cradle to grave”, in other words, there is a wide overlap be-
tween these two types of innovations. 
We conclude that additional investments in cleaner production and products may be 
stimulated by widening the cost gap between the two types of technologies, for instance, by 
additionally charging for the use of waste and energy. The potential for continuously substi-
tuting end-of-pipe technologies with cleaner technologies might be limited, however, since 
not all regulations favoring end-of-pipe technologies can be cut down. For example, addi-
tional filters currently reduce particulate emissions of Diesel cars more effectively than the 
more eco-efficient Diesel engines. Thus, a certain amount of end-of-pipe technologies will 
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still be necessary to curb specific emissions which cannot easily reduced with cleaner produc-
tion measures.  
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Appendix: Description and Descriptive Statistics of Variables.  
 
Name of variable Description Mean Std. Dev.
Choice 
 
End-of-pipe or integrated (change in processes) technologies (1 
end-of pipe, 2 integrated, 3 no new technology) 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Motivations for environ-
mental activities 
 
Incidents 
Image 
Cost Savings 
The variables get the value 1 when “very important” was chosen, 
and 0 for other categories 
 
Prevent or control environmental incidents 
Corporate profile/image 
Cost savings 
 
 
 
0.57 
0.46 
0.43 
 
 
 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
Environmental policy in-
struments 
 
Policy Stringency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulatory Measures 
Market Instruments 
Information 
Voluntary Measures 
Subsidies 
 
 
 
Stringency of environmental policy (1 stringent, 0 not or moder-
ately stringent) 
 
The following variables get the value 1 when “very important” 
was chosen for at least one of the items, and 0 for other catego-
ries: 
 
Input bans, technology and performance standards 
Taxes, tradable permits, liability for environmental damages 
Information measures for consumers and buyers 
Voluntary or negotiated agreements 
Subsidies, tax preferences, technical aid programmes 
 
 
 
0.17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.43 
0.47 
0.15 
0.11 
0.18 
 
 
 
0.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.50 
0.50 
0.36 
0.31 
0.39 
Management tools 
 
Health and Safety System 
Process or Job Control 
System 
Written Environmental 
Policy 
Internal Audit 
Environmental Accounting  
Environmental Report 
 
 
Health and safety management system (1 yes, 0 no) 
Process or job control system (1 yes, 0 no) 
 
Written environmental policy (1 yes, 0 no) 
 
External environmental audits (1 yes, 0 no) 
Environmental accounting (1 yes, 0 no) 
Public environmental report (1 yes, 0 no) 
 
 
0.56 
0.44 
 
0.58 
 
0.57 
0.30 
0.25 
 
 
0.50 
0.50 
 
0.49 
 
0.50 
0.46 
0.43 
Role of interest groups and 
organizations 
 
Internal Forces 
Authorities 
Customers 
Unions 
Green Orgs 
The variables get the value 1 when “very important” was chosen 
for at least one of the items, and 0 for other categories 
 
Corporate headquarters, management employees, shareholders 
Public authorities 
Consumers, commercial buyers, suppliers, banks 
Industrial associations, labour unions 
Environmental organizations, neighbourhood groups 
 
 
 
0.49 
0.44 
0.36 
0.10 
0.22 
 
 
 
0.50 
0.50 
0.48 
0.31 
0.41 
Facility Characteristics 
 
Impacts 
 
Officer 
 
Size 
 
Turnover 
 
 
Importance of environmental impacts (1 very negative impacts, 0 
other) 
Existence of a person explicitly responsible for environmental 
concerns (1 yes, 0 no) 
Number of full time employees in the last three years 
 
Change of turnover in the last three years (0 if it decreased or 
stayed about the same, 1 if it increased) 
 
 
0.34 
 
0.70 
 
332.0 
 
0.33 
 
 
0.47 
 
0.46 
 
855.9 
 
0.47 
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List and explanation of variables (continued) 
Name of variable Description Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Industry dummies 
 
Food 
Textile 
Wood 
Paper 
Chemicals 
Minerals 
Metals 
Machines 
Transport 
Other sectors 
 
 
Food products, beverages and tobacco 
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 
Wood and wood products, furniture 
Pulp paper, paper products, printing and publishing 
Chemicals, fuel, rubber and plastic products 
Other non-metallic mineral products 
Basic metals and fabricated metal products 
Machinery, electrical and optical equipment 
Transport equipment 
e. g. recycling 
 
 
0.10 
0.05 
0.05 
0.08 
0.15 
0.04 
0.20 
0.24 
0.07 
0.02 
 
 
0.30 
0.22 
0.22 
0.27 
0.36 
0.19 
0.40 
0.43 
0.25 
0.14 
Countries 
 
Canada 
France 
Germany 
Hungary 
Japan 
Norway 
USA 
 
 
1 Canada, 0 Other countries 
1 France, 0 Other countries 
1 Germany, 0 Other countries 
1 Hungary, 0 Other countries 
1 Japan, 0 Other countries 
1 Norway, 0 Other countries 
1 USA, 0 Other countries 
 
 
0.06 
0.06 
0.22 
0.11 
0.36 
0.07 
0.12 
 
 
0.24 
0.25 
0.41 
0.32 
0.48 
0.26 
0.32 
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